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judges struggle to decide which claims of conscience merit special
treatment and which do not. Here is the bitter irony toward which
the squinty-eyed, bandy-legged little error born in Opelika II has
been leading us. A doctrinal departure undertaken in the mistaken
hope of facilitating pluralism leads to the distinctly counter-pluralistic result of favoring some believers over others as unelected
judges confer constitutional immunities which are beyond the
power of ordinary legislative majorities to correct. Justice Jackson
had it right:
The First Amendment grew out of an experience which taught that society
cannot trust the conscience of a majority to keep its religious zeal in the limits that a
free society can tolerate. I do not think it any more intended to leave the conscience
of a minority to fix its own limits.

Insofar as their constitutional advocacy has persuaded us otherwise,
the Jehovah's Witnesses have led us astray.

A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS: POLITICAL THEORY,
RELIGION, AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING. By Ellis Sandoz.! Louisiana State University Press. 1990. Pp. xiv,
240. Cloth, $37.50.
Steven D. Smith 2

At least to a nonspecialist like me, recent scholarship about the
founding generation looks like a virtual deluge. Why then do we
need another book on this subject? The question is especially appropriate in the case of Professor Ellis Sandoz's study because his
book is hardly as elegant or readable as, say, Bernard Bailyn's work.
Professor Sandoz's organization is not tight, and his diction is often
irksome: the book is filled with references to such things as
"Metaxy," "horizons" (as in the founders' "horizon" or the "horizon of philosophy"), and the "tensional dimension of participatory
reality."
Despite these shortcomings, A Government of Laws adds an essential dimension to the "liberalism versus civic republicanism" histories that are now so familiar to constitutional scholars. Indeed, if
Sandoz is right, those histories have largely missed the most important points. In addition, by comparison to much of the recent legalI. Professor of Political Science, Louisiana State University; Director, Eric Voegelin
Institute for American Renaissance Studies.
2. Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
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historical scholarship, Sandoz speaks more directly (in a sense I will
try to explain) to present concerns and needs. For those reasons,
his argument deserves close analysis.
I

Perhaps the most conspicuous aspect of Sandoz's study is his
emphasis upon the religious character of the founders' thought.
Religion, he argues, was not merely a veneer or a vocabulary; on the
contrary, biblical precepts and symbols permeated the thinking of
the founding generation. And it is a mistake to suppose that intellectual and political leaders such as Madison and Jefferson had escaped the piety of the general population to achieve a secular,
"enlightened" perspective; the intellectual elite were, if anything,
even more deeply religious in their thinking than were less educated
Americans.
As he acknowledges, Sandoz is hardly the first scholar to notice the importance of religion to the founding generation. His discussion of the religious element is nonetheless valuable for at least
two reasons. First, as Sandoz repeatedly notes with evident exasperation, many historians and scholars seem immersed in an
"obtuse secularism" that leads them, despite mountainous evidence
to the contrary, to view the American founding as a principally
secular development. I cannot say whether this indictment is valid
with respect to professional historians, but discussions of the founding period in legal literature do deserve Sandoz's criticism. To be
sure, the founders' religiosity is sometimes considered in legal literature specifically dealing with the first amendment's religion clauses,
but in more general discussions this dimension is commonly
overlooked.
A contribution to this journal can serve as an example. In an
essay entitled "The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution: A
Lawyer's Guide to Contemporary Historical Scholarship,"J Professor Suzanna Sherry lists four principal influences on the founders'
thought: "Country" or Old Whig ideology, Enlightenment philosophy, John Locke, and the common law tradition as expounded by
Coke and Blackstone.4 Notice what is missing: there is no mention
of the pervasive influence of Protestant Christianity or of the fact
that the Bible-not Bolingbroke or Blackstone or Locke-was the
most widely-read and cited book in America.s Noting the impor3.
4.
5.
hints to

5 CONST. COMM. 323 (1988).
Id. at 337-39.
Although Sherry does not actually deny the importance of religion, she does offer
that effect. Eg., id. at 329 ("Taught by the Enlightenment to reject the workings of
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tance of "virtue" in the founders' thought, Professor Sherry proceeds to ask, "How did a society cultivate virtue?" Remembering
statements by Washington and Jefferson asserting that religion is
the essential foundation of republican morality, one might expect
that this question would elicit at least a passing allusion to religion.
But no-Sherry finds in the founders' thinking four sources of virtue: broad distribution of land ownership, education, equality, and
an inborn moral sense.6 Even with respect to education there is still
no mention of religious instruction; instead she quotes The Worcester Speculator as to the importance of "the spirit of literature."
Reading Sherry's generally useful essay, one would have no inkling
that religion influenced the founders' thinking in any way.
Likewise current legal doctrine, which holds that government
violates the Constitution if it acts in a way that even creates a perception that it has "endorsed" religion, powerfully reflects such an
"obtuse secularism." So long as such attitudes persist, arguments
like Sandoz's will be a necessary antidote.
But Sandoz's emphasis upon religion serves as more than a reminder of what we already know but are wont to forget. It also
addresses a critical and more difficult question: What did the founders actually derive from their religious beliefs? It is conceivable,
after all, that the founders' beliefs might have been incidentally religious but not inherently or essentially so. For example, some scholars have stressed the colonial attachment to "covenant theology."
In this vein, Donald Lutz has argued that Americans derived the
idea of government by consent from biblical precedent, and indeed
were practicing the idea well before they could have gotten any contractarian notions from Locke. Lutz may be right, but his point
does not suffice to show that religion was more than incidentally
significant. Even if Americans acquired the idea of government by
consent from the Bible, there is nothing inherently religious about
that notion. Hence, modem secular interpreters may be right to
downplay its religious origins as incidental.
For Sandoz, however, religion provided the founders not just
with a precedent for government by consent; it offered them a fullblown "civil theology" and a "comprehensive vision of ultimate reality." I will try to summarize the content of that vision in a moment. For now, it suffices to note that, in Sandoz's view, we cannot
begin to understand the founders' thinking unless we recognize
their "classical and Christian notions of a common human nature
Providence as a sufficient explanation [for political corruption), eighteenth-century writers
blamed the ways of men.").
6. ld. at 337-39.

230

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 8:227

present to all men qua men and the dignity of man created in the
divine image and loved of God." If this is so, the religious influence
on the founders' thought can hardly be dismissed as incidental.
Indeed, the statement just quoted (and much else of a similar
nature) might lead one to interpret the book as a sort of "Christian
nation" tract. But Sandoz disclaims such an interpretation, and I
incline to believe that his disclaimer is warranted. To see why, one
must consider another of the book's major themes-the classical element in the founders' thinking.
II

Everyone knows that the founders, or at least the better educated among them, studied the classics. The critical question, once
again, is what did they learn from this study? And the answer, according to some historians, is "not much." Bernard Bailyn suggested that the founders had only a superficial grasp of what they
read from Greek and Roman thinkers; Jefferson held Plato in contempt, and John Adams thought-not implausibly, I would addthat the Republic must have been meant as a satire. What the founders mainly derived from their classical studies, Bailyn argued, was
a collection of inspiring stories and heroic examples demonstrating
the need for courage and determination in the struggle against corruption and for political liberty.
Sandoz's founders were equally zealous for liberty but less
philosophically obtuse. From the classics, Sandoz argues, the founders derived a "comprehensive vision of ultimate reality" that offered an account of the universe and of the place of mankind within
that universe. The fact that this comprehensive vision ran parallel
in important respects to the world view which the founders derived
from Christian and biblical precepts allows Sandoz to speak of a
dominant "classical and Christian" tradition, 1 and thus to avoid the
narrower "Christian nation" interpretation.
And what was this "comprehensive vision" or "civil theology"
that underlay all of the founders' thought? Sandoz describes the
vision somewhat differently at different points in the book, but a
7. This equation of the classical and Christian traditions strikes me as a vulnerable
point in Sandoz's argument. The biblical God, personal, loving, active in human history,
differs dramatically from the "God of the Philosophers," as represented by Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, passive and oblivious to things mortal; and Sandoz's argument would indicate
that the founders were attached to the former rather than the latter deity. However, Sandoz
sees similarities only on a very abstract level, and argues only that the classical and Christian
traditions were compatible in the eclectic thought of the founders. That claim seems plausible; if the founders assumed a rough equation between biblical precepts and Greek philosophy, they would at least not have been the first to do so.
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succinct summary of its essential tenets would have to include the
following. First, there is an overarching providential order with
both physical and spiritual dimensions. Second, this order constitutes an ontological hierarchy-a Great Chain of Being with levels
and degrees ranging from the merely physical to the spiritual, from
the inert to the divine. Third, the place of human beings within this
hierarchy can be characterized as "In Between." Humans are in
between the beasts and the gods; they are physical beings given to
fleshly lusts, but are also possessed of reason and freedom which
permit them to participate in the divine nature. Consequently, humanity finds it fulfillment in "happiness (eudaimonia) or blessedness (makarios)," according to the classical account, or, in the
Christian version, in "union with God or beatitude." Finally, government facilitates human fulfillment by upholding a "sacred liberty" that must be distinguished both from a "vulgar liberty" or
license and from a coerced righteousness.
This comprehensive vision, Sandoz argues, directly informed
the establishment of constitutional government, which reflected a
"grand but limited conception of man and government." Both
terms-the "grand" and the "limited"-are essential, and serve to
distinguish Sandoz's interpretation of the founders' political theory
from competing interpretations which he rejects. Thus, unlike
those who argue that the founders broke decisively with classical
thought by severing the political question-How should government be constituted?-from the ethical question-What is the good
life for man?-Sandoz argues that the founders' political ideas were
firmly rooted in an encompassing ethical vision. They would have
had little patience with the modem notion-advocated by constitutional scholars such as Ronald Dworkin and Bruce Ackermanthat government must be agnostic about questions of human nature
and of the good. But the founders would also have rejected the
proposition, evident in the writings of some radicals and civic
republicans, that government's job is to transform human nature, or
to drum "civic virtue" into its citizens. Their philosophy recognized, Sandoz contends, that "the notion of saving mankind
through politics is, indeed, not only mistaken but ultimately
disastrous."
Eschewing the extremes of ethical agnosticism and compulsory
virtue, Sandoz's founders adopted a middle course consistent with
our "In Between" status. They designed a government that would
encourage human flourishing-understood in a spiritual as well as a
material sense-but that was carefully limited to prevent either opportunistic or idealistic interferences with the freedom essential to
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that flourishing. "Liberty" and "law" were the cornerstones of this
government.

III
At this point let us note a puzzle that helps to illumine the
book's larger significance. The puzzle is that although Sandoz's ostensible theme concerns the intellectual character of the founding
generation, much of his discussion seems at best distantly related to
that theme. His important introductory chapter dwells on Plato
and Aristotle, making barely a gesture in the direction of the American founders. Later he discusses and quotes some political writings
of Thomas Aquinas, ostensibly to illumine the founders' thinking,
even though he acknowledges that the founders would have resented the insinuation that their ideas were derived from a Catholic
philosopher. What is the point of these apparent diversions?
That question should be considered in connection with another
one: What is the relevance/or us of the founders' political and philosophical views? Scholars such as Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein have recently devoted considerable energy to presenting the
"civic republican" notions held by the founders. But why should
we care? If scholars of republicanism were "originalists" like Robert Bork, their historical project would be understandable; but most
such scholars are plainly not in that camp. So even if their analyses
of history are correct, why does it matter? Or is it simply interesting intellectual history?
For some constitutional scholars this question may be difficult
to answer. But Sandoz's view seems clear enough, and it also provides the clue to the puzzle described earlier. Sandoz believes that
the founders' "comprehensive vision of reality" was not merely a
transitory phase in the ongoing flow of philosophical fashions, but
was rather the expression of a kind of perennial philosophy that,
despite differences of detail, had been held by the major thinkers of
Western culture from the Greeks onward. Moreover, that philosophy is of interest not merely because the founders (or anyone else)
believed it but, more importantly, because it was-and is-true.
Thus, Sandoz affirms that his interest is "theoretical rather than antiquarian or simply historical," and he insists that the founders' philosophy is worthy of study because it "retains its validity and
vitality into the present."
This view explains why Sandoz devotes so much attention to
Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas. He wants to show that the founding
was not so much a modern project as a restoration and rearticulation of medieval and classical ideas. Sandoz's view also provides the
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link between the founding generation and the present. The connection lies not only in the legal contention that the founders' ideas
were embodied in positive law-although they were-but also, and
more importantly, in the philosophical claim that the founders'
comprehensive vision is as valid now as it was two hundred or two
thousand years ago. This philosophical claim is the book's truly
important and daring contribution.
IV

Unfortunately, it is this philosophical claim that is also the
hardest aspect of the book to evaluate. Sandoz never really tries to
prove the claim; rather, he suggests that it is not susceptible to logical demonstration:
Ultimately, the question that underlies any philosophical discussion is always Socrates' question: Look and see if this is not the case . . . . Socrates means for us to
consult the content of our own personal experience; consider the matter with our
reason; consult with those whose opinions are worthy of consultation; and honestly
ascertain, as far as we can, whether or not what is asserted truly conforms with the
realities. These, then, compose the facts of our own experience, and to that we can
give a rather strong name and speak of existential truth.

We are confronted, then, with a depiction of a comprehensive vision
of ultimate reality and an invitation to test that vision through a
Socratic experiment.
Although Sandoz cannot demonstrate that his philosophical
claim is correct, he does argue that the founders' comprehensive
vision is urgently needed. He notes the "contemporary crisis of the
spirit" that afflicts Western civilization. This crisis is due in part to
a Lockean liberalism which, by neglecting "the upper ranges of
man's existence," has generated "grave psychic and social disorders" from which "recovery is, at best, improbable." Unfortunately, says Sandoz, there is little help to be derived from ideologies
that might concur in this part of Sandoz's diagnosis-from a radicalism that "obliterates man by dissolving his essence into sociology," or from a civic republicanism whose nebulous notions of civic
virtue imply a subordination of the individual directly contrary to
the founders' design.
Given these forbidding alternatives, the classical and Christian
tradition that Sandoz seeks to recover deserves reconsideration. In
the prevailing intellectual climate it may seem alien for a serious
scholar to claim that a particular vision of reality-especially a
classical and Christian vision-is actually and universally true. But
Sandoz's book will have failed of its most important purpose unless
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his readers take the book on those terms and then perform the Socratic experiment he recommends.

THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE,
1815-1835. By G. Edward White.t New York and London:
Macmillan Publishing Company. 1988. Pp. xxi, 1009. Cloth,
$95.00.
JOHN MARSHALL'S ACHIEVEMENT: LAW, POLITICS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS.
Edited by Thomas C. Shevory .2 Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press. 1989. Pp. x, 232. Cloth, $12.95.
Herman Be/z3

Over two decades ago Robert Faulkner, in The Jurisprudence
of John Marshall (1968), belatedly demolished the progressive interpretation of the "Great Chief Justice" and, it might be argued, prophetically resolved the debate over republican and liberal influences
on the founding fathers and Marshall before it even began. Progressive scholarship had long depicted Marshall as a conservative defender of property rights and national authority who impeded the
progress of democratic states' rights doctrines. In the years after
Faulkner's study, scholarly controversy focused on whether the
founders-and John Marshall as the preeminent expositor of the
constitutional ideas of the founding-were civic-minded virtuous
republicans, or property-minded possessive individualists. Faulkner
viewed Marshall as a liberal or modern republican who wrote the
principles of constitutional democracy into our fundamental law.
Faulkner did not anticipate, however, the controversy over the nature of constitutional interpretation that was to develop and that is
now one of the major issues in Marshall scholarship.
These two books are significant contributions to Marshall historiography. By focusing on the problem of constitutional interpretation, they supplement Faulkner's work. Both books address the
question of republican and liberal tendencies in the thought of Chief
Justice Marshall. White and Shevory also examine Marshall in relation to the issues of judicial activism and public policymaking. In
I.
2.
3.

Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
Assistant Professor of Politics, Ithaca College.
Professor of History, University of Maryland.

